AAuth

Agent authority belongs in the work record.

AAuth is first-class where it helps: agent identity, mission-shaped authority, signed requests, and verifier-readable access. Sidecat keeps the surrounding product loop durable: work intent, operator approval, credential custody, evidence, and receipt-backed replay.

This is an implementation map, not a claim that hosted Sidecat auth is complete. The current proof is local and source-first; the hosted account and approval surface remains an active target.

Authority chain

AAuth can ride on the wire while Sidecat keeps the work recoverable.

Work intent

Sidecat starts from an effect attempt in the work record: who is acting, what effect is being attempted, why it belongs to this work, and what evidence is expected.

AAuth request

AAuth can give the network edge an agent-shaped authority object: mission, requirement, access, proof, and verifier-readable context.

Operator approval

The operator approval stays explicit. Sidecat records the decision, the scope, and the work context before a protected external effect is allowed.

Credential custody

sidecatd holds admitted credentials under purpose, budget, lifetime, and endpoint rules; agents request effects without holding the secret.

Receipt and replay

The applied result is bound to evidence and a receipt so Sidebird, Sidebar, and later agents can inspect what happened instead of trusting a summary.

Implementation map

Current proofs stay separate from the hosted-auth target.

Proven locally

Local identity and approval

The local operator path used browser authentication, operator approval, and a grant-bound GitLab push proof. It is evidence for the authority loop, not a hosted login product yet.

Implemented as an integration path

AAuth-shaped objects

Sidecat work maps to AAuth-Mission, AAuth-Requirement, and AAuth-Access concepts where they help a remote service understand agent intent and authority.

Core Sidecat behavior

Credential custody

Credentials are admitted into sidecatd custody for a specific purpose. The agent asks for an effect; the daemon enforces the credential boundary and keeps the secret out of work records.

Implemented core

Receipts and evidence

A protected effect needs evidence and a receipt that binds the actor, effect, target, inputs, and observed result. AAuth may enrich that record, but the record does not depend on AAuth.

Next feedback surface

Hosted Sidecat authority

Hosted account identity, app.sidecat.org routing, API-first agent access, and sidecatd federation remain the near-term hosted-authority target. This page names the contract the hosted surface must satisfy.